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"DECISION TREES"
by Peter L. Strauss and Michael R. Toppingt
The object of this paper is to inform those concerned with the administration
of justice in Ethiopia - particularly, criminal justice - about a new and simple
procedure which may assist in procuring uniform interpretation and application of
laws and regulations. The problem of uniform interpretation and applicatioh is
particularly severe where, as in Ethiopia, new laws must be interpreted and applied
by persons who have not yet had the opportunity of formal legal education. For
these persons the discovery of the relevant code articles and the understanding of
their interrelationships and application must be very difficult indeed. One possible
result of this unfortunate state of affairs is that the codes will not be fully, effectively, or consistently applied throughout the Empire. If, on the other hand, administrators try to avoid this problem by assigning the Empire's comparatively few
legally trained persons to such jobs as public prosecutor, woreda court judge, etc,
then the result may be waste of legal resources. No one of these jobs is, in national perspective, of the very greatest importance; overall inefficiency of performance
in them, on the other hand, can markedly reduce the quality of Ethiopian justice.
The most efficient use of Ethiopia's limited legal resources might be promoted
by a scheme which enabled the central administration in Addis Ababa to send
provincial centers of law enforcement programmed instruction, which would enable
even persons who have not had formal legal training to proceed, step by step,
through the solution of a legal problem to its proper conclusion. This paper is
concerned with one such form of programmed instruction, which involves the construction of what have been designated variously as "algorithms," "flow charts,"
"logical trees," or "decision trees."* The last term, "decision tree," will be used
here, since it best expresses the purpose of the procedure: to assist local administrators to reach uniform and correct decisions in applying national law. For reasons
of convenience, this article will discuss "decision trees" only as they might apply
in penal law. It will be apparent, however, that the procedure could as easily find
application in any area of codified law.
If we take almost any article of the Penal Code, we shall observe that for
it to be applicable, a number of conditions have to be satisfied. Let us take as
an example, Article 589(I), which defines the principal offence of rape. Before that
offence is constituted, there must be:
(a) an accused who has
(b) compelled
(c)

*
**

a woman

Formerly members of the Faculty of Law, Haile Sellassie I University.
A clear and comprehensive account of the nature and uses of decision trees is to be found
in B.N. Lewis, I.S. Horogin & C.P. Gane, flow Charts, Logical Trees and Algorithms, London HMSO, 1967, to which the present writers are indebted.
-
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(d)

to submit to sexual intercourse

(e) outside wedlock by
either (f) violence
or (g) grave intimidation
or (h) after having rendered her unconscious
or (i) incapable of resistance.
Unless each of conditions (a), (b) (c) (d) and (e), and, at least, one of conditions (f), (g), (h) or (i) are satisfied in any given case, the offence of rape has
not been committed.
A check list such as this, indicating the necessary pre-conditions for application,
could be prepared for almost any code provision. In this form, however, it might
not seem to serve any useful purpose. It appears to be little more than a cumbersome way of restating the article itself.
One of the contributions of the decision tree becomes apparent if the check
list is put in question form:
1. (a) Did the suspect use violence on a person?
(b) Did the suspect use grave intimidation on a person?
(c) Did the suspect render a person unconscious?
(d) Did the suspect render a person incapable of resistance?
2. Was that person a woman?
3. Did he thus compel that woman to submit to sexual intercourse?
4. Was that act of sexual intercourse between persons who were not then husband
and wife?
and if a mandatory instruction is added:
The suspect may be convicted of rape only if the answer to each of questions
2, 3 and 4 and to at least one of questions l(a), 1(b), l(c) or l(d) is "yes."
The form serves to emphasize the separate elements which must be present to
constitute the offence, by requiring the local administrator to answer relevant questions and instructing him to proceed only if certain answers to those questions
are obtained. He is thus forced to analyze the evidence in the appropriate way,
and taken, step by step, through a decision process which he might not have correctly understood by himself.
The decision tree itself embodies the same technique of breaking legal provisions down into their constituent elements, and then presenting each element in
the form of a simple question. It goes further, and puts these questions in logical
order and diagrammatic form. This has the advantage, as we shall see later in
dealing with more complex "decision trees," of simplifying the mandatory instruction. For the user, it has the great advantage of being a visual as well as a
verbal process, and of never requiring him to do more than answer "yes" or "no"
to a simple question. The only constraint is that having answered one question,
he must proceed to the question diagrammatically indicated by that answer, and
so on to a stated result, which he must accept as correct. The proedeure automatically directs him to the appropriate questions and the correct outcome. In the
words of Messrs. Lewis, Horogin and Gane the user "is like a computer working
through a program. In both cases the process is automatic, and provided there
are no ambiguities of instruction, a successful outcome is guaranteed."
The simplest way of explaining the nature and use of decision trees is by
examples. Let us therefore, first of all try to put the requirements for the commission of the offence of rape, as defined by Article Penal Code 589, in "decision tree "form.
-448
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DECISION TREES
Fig. I
START
Did the suspect use violence upon a woman?
L

Did he compel the woman
to submit to sexual inter-

Did suspect use grave intimidation upon a woman?

Yes

course under such influence?

No

Yes

Did suspect
unconscious?

render

a

woman

Did suspect render a
incapable of resistance?

woman

Yes
No

I

Yes
Was that
intercourse

act of
outside

of wedlock?

589 inapplicable

589 inapplicable

I

I

589

applicable

589 inapplicable

This diagram is, it is hoped, self-explanatory. Like the words of Article 589 themselves, it serves to define the offence of rape by setting forth the pre-requisites of
the offence. By stating these pre-requisites separately, and in question form, it performs the significant added function of predigesting the article -stressing
what is
important and forcing the administrator's attention, in logical order, to the conclusions he must reach in order to justify conviction. The administrator is no longer
completely
free to overlook or to misunderstand one of the constituent elements
of the offence.
The diagram assumes, however, that the administrator has already decided,
by some other means, that "rape" is in fact the crime he is interested in. An
additional, and greater, use of decision trees is to assist in the making of this
kind of decision: to help the administrator decide which of several provisions before
him is relevant to a case at hand. Decision trees which perform this finding function have been called "homing decision trees." A very simple example of such a
tree, one step more complex than our tree for Article 589(1), can be constructed with
reference to the crime of bigamy. This is a crime which can be committed in
either one of two fact situations. Under Article 616(1), bigamy is committed by the
already married person who intentionally contracts another marriage before dissolu-
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tion of the first; under Article 616(2), bigamy is committed by an unmarried person
who marries another whom he knows to be tied by the bond of an existing marriage.
The following decision tree would enable us to determine whether in any given
case Article 616 is applicable, and, if it is, whether a charge should be preferred
under Article 616(1) or Art. 616(2).
Fig. 2
START

Was the suspect validly married immediately
before the occurrence of any events which
might have given rise to a criminal charge?

I

No

Yes

Did he thereafter marry?

intentionally conDid
tract heanother marriage?

Was such other marriage contracted before
the dissolution of
the first?

616 inapplicable

Was his partner tied

616 inapplicable

by the bond of an
existing marriage?

No

Yes
Did he know of this fact
at the time of the marriage?

616 inapplicable

No

Yes

I

Charge under 616(1)

Charge under 616(2)

616 inapplicable

j

I
616 inapplicable

This, again, is a very simple model, but it does help us to see how a properly constructed decision tree can be utilized to select the appropriate code provision.
In the two simple decision trees produced above, no effort has been made to
show the relationships which every Special Part article has to articles of the General Part. In consequence, the mere use of these decision trees would not (any
more than simple reference to Article 589 or Article 616) enable the user to decide
upon the disposition of the case. For example, the accused might plead a mistake
of fact, (Article 76) - in a rape case, that he thought the woman was his wife; in a
bigamy case, that he believed a previous marriage was no longer valid. Questions
of attempt, guilt, causality, responsibility, and the like may often arise in ways
which would not always be obvious to the untrained person faced with the neces-

450

-

Digitized from Best Copy Available

Fig. 3
Was there an effort to have sexual intercourse
with a woman without her consent?

Was a man's sexual organ introduced into the woman's?

I

[ArLI 589 inapplicable.[

I
I

Yes

See decision tree on attempt for
possible incomplete offence.

Was the man having such intercourse with the woman her husband?

Was it believed
husband?

he

Yes

I

-

Yes
was

her

I

Was there intent* to compel her
to have intercourse with a person
not her husband?
*(See decision tree on criminal
guilt)
No

No

Yes
Art. 589
inapplicable

1

I

See decision tree
on attempt.

Art. 589 inapplicable

Did the woman seem to agree
to the act of intercourse ?

No

Was the act the product of the
intent?

Jabove

Y
Yes

Yes

I

Was grave intimidation first used
on her?

I

o

-

j

1

N
No14

I
589 applicable

I

f

589 inapplicable

NO

/

-yes-

Was violence used on her ?
I
Was she rendered unconscious?

Was her submission the product
of this influence?
Yes

j589 applicable

t

I

I

Yes

No
I
Yei

Was she rendered incapable

1resistance?

No

No

Punishable only
as attempt, Arts.

27/589.

Was the agreement otherwise
compelled?

i

-
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No
I
589 inapplicable
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sity to understand or administer the codes. It would be inefficient
to deal with
these general questions, which could
arise under almost any provision of the Special Part, in each decision tree that was
constructed with respect to a particular
offence; these questions may deserve separate,
generalized trees of their own. But
it may promote efficiency in applying the
Code to indicate in decision trees for
specific offences how, at least, the most common
of these general questions might
arise. Thus, our decision tree on rape might
be revised to accomplish this in the
manner shown by Fig. 3 above.
We are now in a position to take more
complex examples, which go farther
:towards showing the interrelationships of
complexity in a single tree, however, might a group of legal provisions. Too mtch
threaten to deprive the tree of its vglue
as a simplifier of the law. Moreover, enough
has been said about decision trees
to realize that they may have. several uses.
The prosecutor will want to know
how to coordinate provisions of the Special
part to which he might refer in formulaing his charge. He may also find it valuable
to have reference to General Part
provisions which could modify the charge
or affect proof requirements at trial.
He may not, on the other hand, be overly
interested in possible defences, or in
learning of the circumstances which could authorize
a judge to increase or decrease a
sentence. Thus, for his purposes, only some
of the many interrelationships need be
shown. Similarly, for the judge, less emphasis
on possibilities for charge and more
emphasis on possibilities for disposition may
be appropriate. A separate, educational
function may be served by decision trees
which reveal the interrelationships of
commonly used sections of the General Part.
The three decision trees which follow are
intended as examples of each of
these types. The first emphasizes the "homing
tree" approach which may help prosecutors to find the appropriate charge among
principally based on the nine articles of Book several interrelated provisions. It is
V, Title I, Chapter 1, Section II
of the Special Part, dealing with abortion.
The second is derived from this tree,
but stresses sentencing information. The third,
dealing with General Part problems,
might help answer the question whether an
incomplete offence has been perpetrated.
The reader will by now have been led to an
obvious question: how does one
draft a decision-tree? There is - at any rate
for the lawyer - no answer. To quote
Messrs. Lewis, Horogin, and Gane once more,
constructing a decision tree "is a
valuable exercise in clear thinking. This is
so because the compiler must penetrate
an often dense and tortuous style in order
to determine that which will exactly
embody the rules governing the decision
making process." A logical basis for a
decision tree is of course essential, but it is
not (for the lawyer) enough: a certain
intuitive element is involved. In compiling our
decision tree relating to abortion, we
might have felt it necessary to cover the situation
of an abortion procured during
an election meeting: we might have felt it
necessary to deal with the hypothesis
that the abortion was performed in Khartoum
and so forth. The situation
seemed too remote from the normal and therefore
a
selective
process was applied.
The size of any particular tree must be
limited. The drafting of decision trees
is an art as well as a science. There is no
reason, in theory, why we could not
construct a tree which covered the whole
area of penal law, including procedure,
a tree which would tell us whether any,
and if so, which offence or offences had
been committed, what charge or charges should
be preferred, how the subsequent
trial proceedings should be conducted, what
modes of disposition were open to the
court in the event of a conviction, and by what
considerations the court should be
guided in its ultimate disposition. There are,
however, no office walls large enough to
..
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Fig. 4 ABORTION
Was there an effort to terminate the pregnancy
of a woman believed to be pregnant?

I

Yes
Was

the effort

No

J.

deliberate?

No

Abortion laws do not apply (except those
relating to advertising, see Art. 802(b)

Yes

Did the effort succeed?
Yes

No

_

Was the effort made
by the woman?
I

Yes

t

_

I

Art. 27 in addition.
j

Was she assisted? (See "principals").

Yes

1

No

I

Charge
529.

-

I-Yes
Charge all under 530(2).

Arts. 27, 29, and 532 in
addition.

Was it made with her apparent consent?

NO
Was it made, whjle

torted by threats, coercion or deceit?
I

she was incapable of
consenting, with the
consent
of herornext
legal
representative
of kin?

Yes
YeNo

e

No

Answer remaining quettions.
If a charge is justified, cite

Was this consent ex-

Was there a grave and imminent danger
to her life and health which could only
be averted in this way?

Was there a grave and imminent danger
to her life or health which could only be
averted by immediate intervention?

Yes

Yes

Was the intervention

Z

done

by
a registered medical practitioner?
Yes

IWere

1

Yes

Chreher

ticipants under
Art 529

_

Yes

Aswer remaining questions.
If a charge is justified cite

No

Charge all par-

Was the woman pregnant?

__

Was the intervention

done by
a registered medical practitioner?

o

No
the formalities of!

jarge all actorsi

Art. 534 observed?
Yes

Yes

untmderArt. 530(1)1,2

Charge him under
Art. 536(2), 7903,

No
Carellcts

underArt. 530(2),

No

Were the formalities of Art.
535 observed?

I

I

j
-

Was there a grave and imminent danger to her
life and health which could only be averted by
immediate intervention?

NOYe

1

Charge under
Art. 535(2) 3

No
Was notification subsequently
given to the proper authorities?

Charge all actors under Art. 530(1) 1, 2.

SJNo
j N o charge
I.

2.
3.

j

-

--

I

Charge doctor under Arts. 536(2).

See next page for possibilities of aggravation and mitigation of penalty.
It is uncertain whether the woman is guilty of an offence.
In ease of repeated offences, Art. 122 may also be cited.

-
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ed in its ultimate disposition. There are, however, no office walls large enough to
a
carry the necessary tree. Nor, if there were, would anyone wish to use such
effectree's
decision
the
limits
size
complex instrument which would hardly simplify
as a
tiveness for the law. It is for this reason that there is an intuitive as well
logical element involved in the construction of legal decision trees.
Fig. 5
II. Sentencing persons found to have violated abortion provisions
A. MITIGATION
Was the abortion performed (or attempted) on
account of an exceptionally grave state of
physical distress? For example, after rape or
incest, or as a result of extreme poverty).

No
_
I
Was there nonetheless great material
or moral distress, apprehension of a
grave threat, or justified fear?

Yes
I
Free mitigation under Art. 185 I
1
is possible. (Art. 533).

t

8 iited
Limite

smiigatn ur
mitiation

I

No

Yes
YWas

.

,

the offender acting under the
of a person to whom he owed

urt 9influence

obedience or on whom he depended?
No
honorable
out of
offender act
Did
of a
because
or an
motive,
disinterested
and the

1-Yes-I

high religious, moral or civil conviction?
No

-

Yes

Was the offender previously of good
character?

-

No

Yes

Did he act without thought or because of lack of
intelligence, ignorance, or simplicity of mind?

-

No
Mitigation will not ordinarily be possible.

important caveat
It should now be clear what the decision tree can do. An
It canmust be entered at this stage to indicate what a decision tree cannot do.
the mechanical,
not perform the truly creative part of the lawyer's task, but only
as to the
arises
dispute
part. A decision tree is helpful where and only where no
-
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meaning of the questions which the user has to answer. We could, for example,
construct a decision tree for Penal Code Articles 608-613 relating to offences tending
to
corrupt public morals, and at various points our tree would ask the user whether
an
act was "obscene" or "purely artistic, literary or scientific in character." No
decision tree, no mechanical process, can answer such a question, save in the
clearest
of cases. The user of the tree can properly decide that an authoritative and
lavishly illustrated medical text book on anatomy is not obscene, and that some
work
of "hard-core" pornography is. But he can do nothing with D.H. Lawrence's
controversial novel, Lady Chatterley's Lover. That is a matter for the courts, for
genuinely creative legal argument in the light of external authority and policy analysis.
The decision tree, in fact, does the boring part of the lawyer's job.
S

B.

Aggravation

Has the offender made a profession of abortion,
that is, does he try to acquire a gain whenever
the opportunity presents itself?
No
Did the offender in this case act
principally in order to acquire
financial gain?
No

Yes
Is the offender a doctor, pharmacist,
midwife, nurse, or similar professional?

Yes

Fiscal penalties unjustified

Yes
_________________________No

Court may prohibit practice, either
temporarily or (for repeated offences)
permanently, Art. 53(2). It may also
impose a fine of up to E $10,000 in addition to imprisonment to the degree pro-

Court may impose a fine of up
to E $ 10,000 in addition to
imprisonment to the degree provided and confiscation of any profit,
Arts. 531(1) and 90.

vided and the confiscation. of any profit,

Arts. 531(2) and 90.

The

general

aggravating

circumstances

of Art.

81 may also apply, and justify imposition of a
punishment within the upper range of the limits
given.

Efficient legal administration, however, requires that this boring part of the
lawyer's job be well done. Issues must be swiftly and accurately identified,
so that
appropriate evidence and arguments can be marshalled for creative work. The
discovery of relevant code articles, their relationship and application, is an essential
first step. In a nation such as Ethiopia, where formal legal education is not
yet
widespread, even this first step must often be difficult indeed. As stated
above,
what the decision tree might do is to facilitate the taking of this important
first
-
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Fig. 6

DEGREES

I

Is suspect

COMMISSION

THE

IN

OF AN OFFENCE (Arts.

to be charged with an

IYes
Is the offence one under the Code of
Petty Offences?

26-31)

intentional offence? I
No I

Negligent offences are prosecuted only
if the offence is complete, i.e., if the
forbidden result was caused by accused's
negligent behavior, Art. 27.

I

Yes

I

No
Did the suspect intend to commit the,
offence?

Petty offences may be prosecuted only if
complete, i.e., only if all elements of
a violation are present, Art. 696.

No

Yes
Did the suspect act or intentionally
omit to act in some way helpful to the
commission of the offence?
SYes

Suspect cannot be found guilty of the
No

Did this act unequivocably point, by way of direct consequence, to the commission of the offence?
I Yes

Acts which merely prepare or make
possible an offence are punishable only if
a Special Part of Petty Offence provision
expressly makes them punishable, e.g.
Arts. 269, 472, 763. Art. 26.

Was the accused, because of simplicity
of mind or superstition, using completely
harmless means or processes? (E.g., spells,
"magic" water).
Yes
Accused is not punishable, Art.
29, second paragraph.

I-No

When accused ceased acting, had he
pursued his criminal activity to its end,
so that there remained no more for him
to do?

Was accused using means (e.g., unloaded
rifle) or acting against an object (e.g.,
tree stump) such that the offence (e.g.,
homicide) could not conceivably be completed?

SYes

Did the result
Occ~?
occur?
No

Was it caused by I
the accused's act?
The complet
ed offence should becharged.

Did he cease acting of his own free
will, without interference from external
circumstances or the authorities?
Yes

I No

Art. 29. Impossibility,
applies. Court may, but
need not reduce punishment underArt. 185 from
that for full offence.

7 yes

[No

Yes

[

Was he
Does the offence with
honesty or
which accused is cbiarged
require achievemeiat of
?Yes
a particular result'
Yes_
No
Yes
Renuniatio.No ]
o
Renunciation
T
punishment possIThe completed I
ible, Art. 28(1).
offense should

1

I

be charged.
Did accused prevent or
Vtielp to prevent the result
- by acting of his own
free will?
N

NO

-

Attempt, Art. 27.
Court may reduce
full offense penalty. Art. 185.

"
Active re
ce, Art. 28
may
i urt
1full offenc
Ity Art. 1:

No

by
prompted
high motives?
I
No
N
Art. 28(I), Renu-

nciation, requires
reduction of penalty for full offence under 184;
permits it under
Art. 185.

Did accused use means or act against
an object such that the offence could
not conceivably have been completed?
Yes
Art. 29, Impossibility applies. Court may reduce
full offence penalty, Art. 185.

Digitized from Best Copy Available

No
Attempt, Art. 27.
Court may reduce full offence
penalty, Art. 184.

DECISION TREES

step. Presumably, it does not need a high-level legal education to know that one
is dealing with abortion rather than with an electoral offence. Given, then, an
appropriately drafted set of basic decision trees the efficiency of local law enforcement officers not possessing a legal education would be greatly enhanced, and at
the same time those who did possess a formal legal education would be released
from the mere mechanics of law to finding the more creative and more important
tasks for which their training has fitted them.
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